MiFID II — the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II — fundamentally changed the economics of research and corporate access in European markets when it came into force in January 2018, and its ripple effects have continued to reshape the global investment management and investor relations industry in the years since. As we operate in 2026, MiFID II is no longer a new regulatory challenge to adapt to but a mature regulatory framework that has permanently restructured how corporate access is delivered, priced, and consumed. This update covers where the regulatory landscape stands in 2026 and what it means practically for IR teams and corporate access professionals.
What MiFID II Did to Corporate Access
The core MiFID II change relevant to corporate access was the “unbundling” requirement: investment managers subject to MiFID II (primarily EU-regulated firms and their global affiliates) were required to pay for research and corporate access separately and explicitly, rather than bundling these costs within trading commissions. Prior to MiFID II, the soft commission system allowed investment managers to pay for research and corporate access implicitly through execution commissions — making the cost of research and corporate access effectively invisible to end investors.
Unbundling forced explicit pricing of corporate access for the first time. This had several cascading effects: buy-side firms had to evaluate the value they received from corporate access against the explicit cost; sell-side firms had to justify the cost of corporate access programs; and issuers who had relied on sell-side distribution of corporate access had to consider whether direct access to investors was more efficient and cost-effective than relying on broker-facilitated introductions.
The 2026 Regulatory Landscape: What Has Changed
MiFID II Amendments and Relaxations
The European Commission and ESMA have made targeted amendments to MiFID II’s research unbundling rules since 2018. Notably, amendments have allowed smaller issuers (those with market caps below €1 billion) to be exempted from unbundling requirements, addressing concerns that MiFID II was reducing research coverage of smaller companies. The UK’s post-Brexit FCA has also made its own modifications to the research payment rules, diverging from the EU framework in ways that create cross-border complexity for global investment managers.
Global Adoption Patterns
MiFID II’s unbundling rules apply directly only to EU-regulated investment managers, but their impact has been global. Major global asset managers — many of which are dual-regulated or have elected to apply MiFID II standards globally for consistency — have adopted unbundled research payment practices worldwide. This means IR teams dealing with the largest institutional investors globally are operating in a de facto unbundled environment regardless of whether they are a U.S., Asian, or European issuer.
The Rise of Direct Corporate Access
Perhaps the most significant structural outcome of MiFID II in 2026 is the normalization of direct corporate access — issuers connecting directly with investors without sell-side intermediation. When corporate access had no explicit price (because costs were bundled in commissions), the broker’s role as intermediary was invisible and costless from the issuer’s perspective. Once explicit pricing revealed the actual cost of broker-facilitated access, both issuers and investors began evaluating direct connectivity as an alternative. WeConvene was built to facilitate exactly this direct connectivity, providing the scheduling, event management, and workflow infrastructure that makes direct corporate access operationally practical.
Practical Implications for IR Teams in 2026
- Maintain both direct and broker-facilitated access channels: The most effective IR programs use direct access (via WeConvene) for existing relationships and targeted new account outreach, while continuing to work with sell-side partners for conference facilitation and introductions to accounts where the sell-side relationship provides the initial access.
- Data ownership matters more than ever: In a broker-facilitated world, meeting data lives with the broker. In a direct access world, the issuer owns the engagement data. Capturing and using this data for targeting and program measurement is a competitive advantage that IR teams must actively develop.
- Expect buy-side budget pressure on corporate access to continue: MiFID II’s transparency mechanism has put persistent downward pressure on buy-side budgets for corporate access. IR teams should continue to invest in making their programs high-value and efficient for the buy-side contacts they engage with.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do MiFID II rules apply to U.S.-listed companies?
MiFID II applies directly to EU-regulated investment managers, not to U.S. issuers. However, because many major institutional investors who own U.S. stocks are MiFID II-regulated (European asset managers, global managers who have adopted MiFID II standards), U.S. issuers deal with the practical consequences of MiFID II in their investor engagement. Direct corporate access practices and explicit value delivery to buy-side contacts are increasingly expected regardless of issuer jurisdiction.
How should IR teams price corporate access if the sell-side is charging for it?
Most issuers do not charge for corporate access directly — issuer-to-investor engagement is not a service that issuers price. The pricing dynamic under MiFID II exists on the sell-side, where brokers must explicitly price the corporate access services they provide to buy-side clients. From the issuer’s perspective, the implication is that broker-facilitated meetings have an explicit cost on the buy-side that direct meetings do not — which makes the ROI case for direct corporate access platforms stronger.
